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MUST WE CARRY OUR STOCKS AND BONDS
IN OUR POCKETS?
(Being an attempt to follow the reasoning of the Supreme Court of the United
States during the past forty years, by which it has for a second time arrived
at multiple taxation of intangibles)
By FLOYD E. DIX*
A resident of Gary, Indiana, died the owner of a share of
the capital stock of a Delaware corporation. He was also
the owner of a business in Chicago, Illinois, which he op-
erated entirely from an office in Kalamazoo, Michigan, where
accounts receivable of the business were payable and from
which office he paid all bills. For many years he had used the
stock in connection with the financing of the business in
Illinois but at the time of his death the certificate was found
in his safe deposit box in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, along with
other intangibles connected with the business. Without con-
sidering the possibility of reciprocal state legislation, which
one or more of the states is entitled, to levy a property tax
on the stock for the year prior to his death and which one
or more may levy upon it an inheritance, succession or transfer
tax? If these questions were put to the 1940 graduating
class of one of our law schools, we imagine the answers would
be somewhat amusing. If they were submitted, for curbstone
opinion, to a group of older lawyers, the results would un-
doubtedly be interesting. Interesting, but not very amusing,
is the answer, that, if not under the specific holding, at least
under the reasoning of Curry v. McCanless and Graves v.
Elliott,' decided by the Supreme Court in May of 1939,
both taxes could be levied in Indiana, decedent's domicile;
in Delaware, the corporation's domicile; in Illinois, where
the stock had a business situs; in Michigan, where it had
a commercial domicile; and in Wisconsin, where it was
physically found.
* Of the Terre Haute Bar.
'307 U. S. 357 and 383.
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"All subjects over which the sovereign power of a state
extends, are objects of taxation, but those over which it does
not extend, are, upon the soundest principles, exempt from
taxation." So spoke Chief Justice Marshall in 1819.2 "En-
joyment of the privileges of residence in a state, and the
attendant right to invoke the protection of its laws, are
inseparable from responsibility for sharing the costs of gov-
ernment. Taxes are what we pay for civilized society."3
"The power of taxation, indispensable to the existence of
every civilized government, is exercised upon the assumption
of an equivalent rendered to the taxpayer in the protection of
his person and property * * *. If the taxing power be
in no position to render these services, or otherwise to benefit
the person or property taxed, and such property be wholly
within the taxing power of another state, to which it may be
said to owe an allegiance, and to which it looks for protection,
the taxation of such property within the domicile of the owner
partakes rather of the nature of an extortion than a tax." 4
"The power to tax carries with it the power to embarrass
and destroy.'' 5
And so, ad infinitum, could be copied the repeated pro-
nouncements of our Supreme Court upon these undoubted
principles. But as is true with most legal formulas, the state-
ment is easy, but the application is difficult.
Property, of course, is relegated into three general classifi-
cations: land, tangible personal property and intangibles.
Land, being immobile, has caused no difficulty with the prob.
lem of its situs for taxes of all kinds; except from the
standpoint of income therefrom and intangible evidences of
ownership therein. As to tangible personal property, it was
long thought in England that the ancient maxim "mobilia
sequuntur personum" (movables follow the person) deter-
mined the taxing situs as the domicile of the owner. The
Supreme Court early recognized an exception, however, and
2 McCulloch v. Md. 4- Wheat. 316.
s Campania v. Collector, 275 U. S. 87.
4 Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Ky., 199 U. S. 195.
5 Evans v. Gore, 253 U. S. 245.
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in 1890 firmly fixed the law to be that it might be taxed in
the state where it was found, regardless of where its owner
lived.6 This was followed in 1904 and 1905 by holdings
that where permanently located in other states it could not
be subjected to property taxes at the domicile of the owner.7
Intangibles, from a transitory standpoint, might be defined
as those evidences of obligations which may be created here,
secured there, owned yonder, used some place else, controlled
at still another place and be found at yet another. With
the growth of modern financing, requiring as it does the
multiple distribution and ownership of the stocks and bonds
of large corporations, the taxing officials, legislatures and
courts have become more and more concerned with seeing that
the owners of intangibles shall bear their proportionate share
of the cost of government. That this cost has increased
slightly during the past few years has not detracted from this
vigilance. No less, it seems, should the owners be concerned
with protecting their property from confiscation by multiple
taxation.
Where then, may intangibles be taxed?
It will be the purpose of this article to try to review the
reasoning by which the Supreme Court has reversed itself
on this question the second time in the past ten years. No
attempt will be made to cover decisions rendered prior to
the turn of this enlightened century, full citation of which the
reader may find in the opinions of the cases herein discussed.
For the want of some better method, we will review the cases
in the order in which they were decided, so that the reader
may, perchance, follow the trend over the years to the present
logical or illogical conclusion.
The struggle between the state and the taxpayer will be
dealt with without distinction between an inheritance (an
excise) and a property (an ad valorem) tax. For our pur-
pose, there is little, if any, distinction between the two.
Although the Court has, from time to time, noted differences,
6 Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pa., 141 U. S. 18.
7 Delaware L. & W. R. Co. v. Pa., 198 U. S. 341 ; Union Refrigerator Transit
Co. v. Ky., 199 U. S. 195.
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and although it has come to consider control over the owner
a reason for jurisdiction over the property, no line of de-
markation has been definitely worked out and it is fair to
suppose that the statement made in 1924 in Frick v. Pa.8
to the effect that "to impose either tax the state must have
jurisdiction over the thing that is taxed" is still true. In other
words, the writer believes that the reasoning of Curry v.
McCanless must fairly be interpreted to apply to both kinds
of tax.
We start, of course, with the precept that the imposition
of a tax without jurisdiction is a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment (not to be confused with the recent statements of
the Court that the Constitution does not guarantee against
double taxation). What then, more narrowly stated, con-
stitutes jurisdiction over an intangible?
The first comprehensive attempt to deal with the problem
was in New Orleans v. Stempel,9 decided in 1899. It re-
sulted in the "business situs doctrine," by language adopted
from a Vermont case 10 that "if persons residing abroad bring
their property and invest it in this state for the purpose of
deriving profit from its use and employment here, and thus
avail themselves of the benefits and advantages of our laws
for the protection of their property, their property should
yield its due proportion towards the support of the govern-
ment that thus protects it." This theory has become firmly
implanted in the law of the Court and has never been de-
parted from. As will be hereinafter shown, this rule must
not be interpreted as exclusive."'
In 1902 Blackstone v. Miller was decided.' 2 The court, by
Mr. Justice Holmes, (Mr. Justice White dissenting) held
8 268 U. S. 473.
9 175 U. S. 309.
10 Catlin v. Hull, 21 Vt. 152.
ii Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U. S. 133; Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. v.
New Orleans, 205 U. S. 395; Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors,
221 U. S. 346; Iowa v. Slimmer, 248 U. S. 115; Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox,
298 U. S. 193; First Bank Stock Corp. v. Minn., 301 U. S. 234.
For its recent application in Indiana, see Miami Coal Co. v. Fox, 203 Ind. 99.
12 188 U. S. 189.
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that a deposit in a New York Trust Company to the credit
of Blackstone, who died domiciled in Illinois, was subject to a
transfer tax imposed by New York, notwithstanding that
the whole succession, including the deposit, had been simi-
larily taxed in Illinois. The court regretted double taxation
by the states but said it infringed no rule of constitutional law.
It was thought that there was no distinction for taxing pur-
poses between money in bank and coin in the pocket; the only
question to be answered in this case being whether the deposit
depended on the law of New York for its existence. The
Court held that it did, because "nothing but the fact that the
law of the place where the debtor is will make him pay."
To illustrate the necessity for invocation of New York law,
the court asked where the Executrix would be if New York
should declare all debts extinguished upon the death of either
party. "The universal succession is taxed in one state, the
singular succession is taxed in another. The plaintiff has to
make out her right under both in order to get the money."
The maxim mobilia sequuntur personam was shed, as a fiction
due to historical tradition; not allowed to obscure the facts
when they become important.
Here there, for the first time, we have advanced the notion
of multiple protection of state law as a basis for multiple
taxation.
In 1906, in the case of Buck v. Beach,13 the Court limited
the doctrine, in holding, on the particular facts, that Indiana
could not levy a property tax upon mortgage notes secured by
Ohio real estate, payable to a resident of New York, merely
because they were held in Indiana for the purpose of avoiding
proper taxation in Ohio. Mr. Justice Peckham, who wrote
the majority opinion, reasoned simply that there was no prop-
erty within the jurisdiction of the State of Indiana. He
thought the notes were but written evidences of the debts
themselves, which could be properly taxed only in Ohio.
Indiana, he said, could have nothing to do with the enforce-
ment of the obligation; the creditor would have to go to
13 206 U. S. 392.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Ohio to find the debtor, as well as the mortgaged land. He
brushed aside the argument that, if the notes were stolen
while in Indiana, the Indiana courts would have to be re-
sorted to to punish the thief; on the theory that that would
be in vindication of the general criminal justice of the state.
The point was evidently not made that, under such circum-
stances, the owners would be put to it to recover the notes
without the help of the law of Indiana. In the dissenting
opinion, Mr. Justice Day thought that notes and mortgages
were of the same character as bank bills and municipal bonds;
all being evidences of existing indebtedness, the latter being
subject to taxation where they are found.
The situation of Blackstone v. Miller was turned around
in 1915 in Bullen v. Wisconsin1 4 and the state of decedent's
domicil was held entitled to levy a succession tax on intangibles
held by a trustee in another state under a revocable trust,
the state where they were held having previously levied such
a tax upon them. Mr. Justice Holmes reasoned: "As the
states where the property is situated, if governed by the
common law, generally recognize the law of the domicil as
determining the succession, it may be said that, in a practical
sense at least, the law of the domicil is needed to establish
the inheritance."
The converse of the Stempel case had arisen in 1905 and
the court held, in Union Refrigeration Transit Co. v. Ky.,15
that the state of domicile had no right to impose a property
tax upon tangibles permanently located in other states. It
was quite natural, therefore, that an effort should now be
made to swing tangibles, for inheritance tax purposes, into
the rule of the Blackstone and Bullen cases. This attempt
failed in the case of Frick v. Pennsylvania,16 decided in 1924.
The unanimous court, Mr. Justice Van Devanter speaking,
reverted to the rule of the Union Refrigerator case and held
that the state of domicile of a decedent could not impose a
succession tax upon tangible property having an actual situs
14 240 U. S. 625.
15 199 U. S. 194.
16 268 U. S. 473.
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in another state. The state of Pennsylvania relied upon the
Blackstone and Bullen cases, but the court swept them aside,
on the simple statement that they involved intangibles. In
this respect a difference was noted without making any distinc-
tion. The queer part is that the court actually grounded its
reasoning on the lack of a distinction and said: "The state
must have jurisdiction over the thing that is taxed and to
impose either (property or succession tax) without such juris-
diction, is mere extortion and in contravention of due process
of law. * * * The situation was the same as if the
property had been immovable realty." The anomalous result
thus reached was that foreign intangibles may be the subject
of inheritance tax at decedent's domicile because the law of
domicil is needed to affect the succession, but that tangibles
may not be so taxed because the state of domicil has no
jurisdiction.
The unanimous court held in 1926 in Rhode Island Hos-
pital Trust Co. v. Doughton17 that a state could not impose
an inheritance tax upon stock of a foreign corporation held
by a non-resident, merely because the corporation was doing
business within the state and had located two-thirds of its
property there. Chief Justice Taft's simple reasoning was
that there was no jurisdiction of the property.
Blackstone v. Miller and Bullen v. W~is. were, however,
reverted to in Blodgett v. Silberman' in 1928, the unanimous
court holding, by Chief Justice Taft, that the interest of a
Connecticut decedent in a New York partnership and U. S.
bonds, shares of stock, mortgage bonds and debentures of
foreign corporations, stock in national banks, promissory
notes of residents of other states and insurance policies issued
by foreign insurance companies, all physically kept in safe
deposit boxes in New York City, were subject to a Con-
necticut transfer tax. Practically the entire opinion is given
over to the matter of determining that such property fell into
the category of intangibles and was therefore not within the
rule of Frick v. Pa. A small amount of bank notes and cash
17270 U. S. 69.
18 277 U. S. 1.
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in the New York safe deposit box was held beyond the power
of Connecticut to tax, because, "money, so definitely fixed
and separated in its actual situs from the person of the owner
as this was, is tangible property." It is interesting to note
that Mr. Charles E. Hughes argued the cause for the state
of Connecticut.
Now we had no distinction between money in bank and
coin in pocket' 9 but we do have one between government
bonds and government bank notes in the same safe deposit
box.
In Safe Deposit and Trust Company v. irginia20 the Su-
preme Court, in 1929, Justice McReynolds speaking, decided
that Virginia could not impose an ad valorem property tax
upon the corpus of a trust fund consisting of stocks and bonds
held by a Maryland trustee for the benefit of parties domiciled
in Virginia. The court gave no consideration to the fact
that the trust had been revocable during the lifetime of the
donor, but placed its decision squarely on the ground that the
securities had an actual situs in Maryland. The main decision
sidestepped the question of the right of Virginia to tax the
equitable interest of the Virginia donees in the property,
but Mr. Justice Stone, in a concurring opinion, thought this
might have been done "quite as much as a debt secured by
a mortgage on land in another jurisdiction, notwithstanding
the fact that the land is also taxed at its situs." Mr. Justice
McReynolds said, "It would be unfortunate, perhaps amaz-
ing, if a legal fiction originally invented to prevent personalty
from escaping just taxation should compel us to accept the
irrational view that the same securities were within two states
at the same instance, and, because of this, to uphold a double
and oppressive assessment." Mr. Justice Holmes, in a
dissenting opinion, thought there was no difference between
taxing the corpus and taxing a beneficial interest of cestuis
que trust. He perceived no limitation against double taxation
in the Fourteenth Amendment 2'
19 Blackstone v. Miller, supra. 20 280 U. S. 83.
21 This case, upon almost identical facts, is used as the sole base by the
Supreme Court of Indiana in the case of Johnston v. State, 212 Ind. 375.
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Up to 1929, therefore, and with reasonably consistent rea-
soning, the court has held:
1. That the state of domicil has no right to impose a
property or inheritance tax upon tangible personal property
having an actual situs in another state, 22 because the state of
domicil does not have jurisdiction of the thing to be taxed.
2. That intangibles in another state are subject to in-
heritance tax in the state of decedent's domicil, 23 because the
law of domicil is needed to establish the inheritance.
3. That the state of domicil cannot impose a property
tax upon intangibles held in a foreign trust,24 because they
have no actual situs in the state of domicil.
4. That a local bank deposit of a non-resident is subject
to inheritance tax,2' because the law of the state where the
bank is located is needed to collect the debt.
5. That intangibles representing obligations of non-resi-
dents to non-residents, secured by foreign real estate, cannot
be subject to a property tax in the state where found,26
because the law of such state is not needed to enforce them.
6. That a state cannot impose an inheritance tax upon
stock of a foreign corporation owned and held by a non-
resident, merely because the corporation was doing business
in and held property within the state; because it had no juris-
diction of the stock.2 7
We are left, at this point, with only one marked distinction
between tangibles and intangibles: to-wit, that while the
former may not be subjected to either a property or in-
heritance tax in more than one state, the latter may be levied
upon for inheritance tax in the state of domicil as well as
in any other state whose laws are necessary to enforcement.
Query whether the reasoning of Curry v. McCanless will be specifically applied
to property taxes. Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Virginia, being, as it is,
discredited, Johnston v. State should, for the present, not be definitely relied
upon.
22 Union Refrigeration Transit Co. v. Ky., supra; Frick v. Pa., supra.
23 Bullen v. Wis., supra; Blodgett v. Silberman, supra.
24 Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Va., supra.
25 Blackstone v. Miller, supra.
26 Buck v. Beach, supra.
27 Rhode Island Hosp. T. C. v. Doughton, supra.
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This distinction was destined to be limited later in 1929
with the overruling of Blackstone v. Miller, in the case of
Farmer's Loan and Trust Company v. Minn.28 By it Minne-
sota was refused the right to impose a transfer tax on
Minnesota municipal and state bonds owned and held in New
York by a New York decedent. Mr. Justice McReynolds
wrote the opinion. In it he did not attempt to answer Justice
Holmes' argument of dual protection of laws, but based his
decision squarely on the proposition that "all the property
there can be in the nature of things in debts of corporations
belongs to the creditors, to whom they are payable; and fol-
lows their domicile, wherever that may be. Their debts can
have no locality separate from the parties to whom they are
due." "A very large part of the country's wealth," he said
"is invested in negotiable securities, whose protection against
discrimination, unjust and oppressive taxation is a matter of
the greatest moment. The inevitable tendency of that view
(Blackstone v. Miller) is to disturb good relations among
the states and produce the kind of discontent expected to
subside after establishment of the Union." He suggested the
possibility that under the different views concerning the situs
for taxation of intangibles, it would be possible for a bond
to be taxed at four different places, to-wit, the domicile of the
owner, the debtor's domicile, where the bond is physically
found and where it has a business situs. Such a startling
possibility, he said, suggests a wrong premise.
Mr. Justice Stone concurred in the result, on the theory
that an inheritance or transfer tax was an excise or privilege
tax and "to sustain a privilege tax, the privilege must be
enjoyed in the state imposing it." He thought, however,
that there are "too many situations in which a single eco-
nomic interest may have such legal relationship with different
taxing jurisdictions as to justify its taxation in both, to
admit our laying down any constitutional principle broadly
prohibiting taxation merely because it is double." 'Consistent
with his former opinion, Mr. Justice Holmes dissented, be-
cause, he said, however contrary double taxation may be to
28 280 U. S. 204.
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enlightened policy, still the argument cannot be avoided
that the law of Minnesota would be necessary to enforce
the obligation and that therefore it should have a right to
tax. "A good deal has to be read into the Fourteenth Amend-
ment," he said, "to give it any bearing upon this case."
The decision went no farther than to overrule the specific
holding of Blackstone v. Miller, by denying the right to levy
an inheritance tax to the state of the debtor's domicil (the
intangibles being physically within the state of the creditor's
domicil).
Three months later, however, Justice McReynolds, in
Baldwin v. Missouri29 extended the doctrine, by denying the
right to tax to the state where the nonresident decedent's
intangibles were physically located. His simple reasoning
was that choses in action pass from the dead to the living
only by virtue of the law of decedent's domicil. As they
(the creditors) were not within Missouri for taxation pur-
poses the transfer was not subject to her power. Mr. Justice
Holmes, dissenting, felt anxiety "at the ever increasing scope
given to the Fourteenth Amendment in cutting down * * *
the constitutional rights of states" and saw "hardly any
limit but the sky to the invalidating of those rights if they
happen to strike a majority of the Court as for any reason
undesirable." Mr. Justice Stone this time also dissented,
distinguishing his concurrence in the Farmer's Loan and Trust
Co. case for the reason that here the choses in action were
actually in the other state, receiving the protection of its laws
to secure delivery. He suggested a good way to get around
double taxation of intangibles was to keep them in the state
of domicil.
This case was the converse of the Blodgett case, and we
now have the rule that the state of domicil only, has the
right to levy an inheritance tax upon intangibles found in
another state; except, of course, where the intangibles may
have acquired a "business situs," "commercial situs," or "a
situs analogous to that of tangible personal property" in the
other state.
29 281 U. S. 586.
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Beidler v. South Carolinas decided the following year
(1930) merely affirmed the two preceding decisions, in hold-
ing that a state could not levy a succession tax upon the
debt of a domestic corporation to a non-resident decedent.
The court held that the indebtedness did not, under the
facts, have a business situs in the state of the corporation's
domicil. The decision strictly avoided the result if a business
situs had existed.
In 1931, in First National Bank v. Maine,31 Mr. Justice
Sutherland, writing a 6 to 3 opinion, decided the specific
point that Maine could not impose a succession tax upon
capital stock of a Maine corporation owned by a Massa-
chusetts decedent. He reiterated that Blackstone v. Miller
had been overruled, reviewed the Frick, Farmers Loan and
Trust Co., Baldwin and Beidler cases and said that the rule
of immunity from taxation by more than one state was
broader than the specific application in those cases made of
it. His reasoning was that the transmission from the dead
to the living was an event which could not take place in
two or more states at one and the same time. "Due regard
for the processes of correct thinking upholds the conclusion
that a determination fixing the local situs of a thing for
the purpose of transferring it in one state carries with it
an implicit denial that there is a local situs in another state
for the purpose of transferring the same thing there." He
said that the taxable event as to tangible property occurs
in the state where the property has actual situs and that,
although the problem is more difficult as to intangibles, it
must be solved unless gross discrimination between the two
classes of property should result. He specifically reserved
from his holding intangible property that may be so used
in a state other than the owner's domicile so as to give it
there a situs analogous to the actual situs of tangible per-
sonal property. His reasoning nevertheless would seem to
apply to such intangibles, because he said: "There is want-
ing on the part of a state other than that of the domicile
30 282 U. S. 1.
31 284 U. S. 312.
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any real tangible relationship to the event which is the subject
of the tax."
Recognizing the conflict in prior decisions, he thought that
"practical considerations of wisdom, convenience and justice
alike dictate the desirability of a uniform general rule con-
ferring the jurisdiction to impose death transfer taxes as to
intangibles to the state of the domicil." The old maxim
mobilia sequuntur personam was not relied upon; the square
out reasoning being that property should be taxed for in-
heritance once and only once and that the jurisdiction of
domicil is the most logical.
Mr. Justice Stone wrote the dissenting opinion, with Mr.
Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis concurring. His
reason again was that the decedent acquired rights and priv-
ileges with respect to the Maine corporation, the nature
and extent of which were defined by the laws of Maine, and
his power to secure the complete transfer of the stock was
therefore dependent upon Maine law. He suggested that
the problem as to double taxation should be solved by
reciprocal state legislation, rather than by resort to the Four-
teenth Amendment; because, he said: "The Constitution
has failed to provide against multiple taxation."
Specifically, the case does not broaden the earlier hold-
ings more than to relegate stock in a domestic corporation
into the same category as bonds, notes, and credits; all of
which, belonging to a non-resident decedent, cannot be made
the subject of a succession tax. We have now, therefore,
reached the firm ground that intangibles are taxable, for any
and all purpose, only at the domicil of the owner; excepting
where they have a business situs elsewhere; in which case,
evidently, they are taxed there only.
32
In City Farmer's Bk. and Tr. Co. v. Schnader,33 Mr. Jus-
tice Butler in 1934, writing the opinion for a unanimous
32 It was this case which led to the passage in 1937 by the Indiana Legisla-
ture of the law authorizing the refunding of intangible taxes theretofore
erroneously, wrongfully or illegally imposed (Chap. 159, Acts of Indiana
General Assembly, 1937).
33 293 U. S. 112.
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court, held that as to tangible personal property with a fixed
location outside the state of the decedent's domicile, the
"transfer cannot be subjected to taxes imposed by more than
one state." The right of the state of the situs only was sus-
tained, the court citing Frick v. Pa.,34 Safe Dep. & Tr. Co.
V. Va.,35 and First Natl. Bk. v. Me.30
In 1935 the court, by a 6 to 3 decision, Mr. Jusice Mc-
Reynolds speaking, held in Senior v. Braden,37 that Ohio
could not impose a property tax upon land trust certificate
representing interest in real estate, some of which was within
and some without the state of domicil of the owner of the
certificates, the owner being entitled to a share of the net
income and, upon sale of the property, to a share of the
proceeds. The reason was two-fold, to-wit, that a state had
not power to tax land or an interest in land beyond its bor-
ders and, as to the land situate within the state, there was
no power to tax in any other manner than by uniform rule
according to value. The main opinion claimed that "Our
concern is with reality, not nomenclature." Mr. Justice
Stone, Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Cardozo con-
curring, wrote the dissenting opinion. He too insisted that
the court must look to substance rather than form, "to the
principles which underlie and justify the taxing power, rather
than descriptive terminology which merely as a matter of
convenience we may apply to the interest taxed." He in-
sisted that the certificate holder was in the same relationship
to the land as the stockholder of a land owning corporation.
He argued that "The objection to double taxation by a single
sovereign is no more potent under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment than the objection that a tax otherwise valid has been
doubled. We think the court is attempting to endow the
Fourteenth Amendment with a newly discovered efficacy to
forbid double taxation.
Here we observe each contending force struggling for
substance rather than form; one to avoid double taxation,
the other to uphold it. The majority of the court seems
34 268 U. S. 473.
35 280 U. S. 204.
36 284 U. S. 312.
37 295 U. S. 422.
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committed, and discredits the double taxing decisions as not
being in accord with "views now accepted here."
It would seem then, that the atmosphere has been sub-
stantially cleared again. Blackstone v. Miller has been spe-
cifically overruled and all attempts to revive it have failed.
The distinction between tangibles and intangibles has been
effectively eradicated and "we can find no sufficient reason
for saying that intangibles are not entitled to enjoy an
immunity against taxation at more than one place similar
to that accorded to tangibles." 33  The views expressed in
Blackstone v. Miller are "not now accepted here in respect
of double taxation. ' 3 9
But there is one exception to these conclusions, one that
the Court has consistently noted, one to which the general
language of eradication does not apply, one which hearkens
back 36 years to the holding of New Orleans v. Stempel4 0-
the doctrine of "business situs" or "situs analogous to that
of tangible personal property." And just as the tiny leak
in the hull may widen to let in the ocean, so has the good
ship of single taxation of intangibles been wrecked by this
break in its armour. Two cases decided before that of
Curry v. McCanless,41 presage the calamity.
In the first, (Wheeling Steel Corp v. Fox) ,42 the unanimous
court, Hughes, C. J., speaking, broke a seven year precedent
of ruling against double taxation of intangibles and intro-
duced an entirely new possibility, as an outcropping of the
business situs theory. The Corporation was domiciled in
Delaware, but maintained its general business offices in West
Virginia; kept is books and held its directors' meetings there;
there its management functioned and its business was con-
trolled and determined. Orders were subject to acceptance
there and invoices were payable there. Its manufacturing
business was conducted largely in other states, where bank
38 Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minn., 280 U. S. 204; Wheeling Steel Corp.
v. Fox, 298 U. S. 193.
39 Senior v. Braden, 295 U. S. 422.
40 175 U. S. 309.
41 307 U. S. 357.
42 298 U. S. 193.
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deposits were created by customers' checks forwarded from
the West Virginia office. The Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia held that such of these bank deposits and
accounts receivable as had not previously been liable for
taxation in other states might be taxed in West Virginia.
The Supreme Court of the United States upheld this conten-
tion on the simple reasoning that the property had a "taxable
situs," was "kept and used," was "localized" in West Vir-
ginia; in short, that that state had jurisdiction to levy the
tax. The company's argument that Delaware, its state of
domicile, had exclusive power to tax its intangibles, was
rejected on the theory that the technical paper designation
of its principal office there did not deprive the states where
the business was actually conducted from taxing the credits
arising in the course of that business. The business situs
principal of intangibles was admitted, but a new term was
created to fit the situation as it existed in West Virginia,
to-wit, that of a "commercial domicile" there. The argu-
ment was advanced that the West Virginia statute required
the taxation of all intangibles of a foreign corporation doing
business within the state, regardless of where else they might
properly be subject to taxation. This argument was thought
not pertinent in this case because the state court had held
that the statute intended to exclude from taxation all in.
tangibles subject to tax in another state. But the Court
expressly refused to pass on this constitutional aspect of the
statute and held that "upon this record the question before
us is with regard to the constitutional validity of the tax as
assessed in West Virginia and not as to the amount or validity
of any tax assessed elsewhere." Thus was the door left
open by a unanimous court, four of the Justices failing to
sense, undoubtedly, the flood that was later to pass through.
In the second of the two intervening cases, the commercial
situs theory was impliedly held not exclusive by Justice Stone,
speaking for an eight man court (Mr. Justice Butler not
taking part) in First Bank Stock Corporation v. Minn.,43
decided in 1936. The holding was that a Delaware corpora-
43 301 U. S. 234.
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tion having its principal office and business in Minnesota
could be required to pay a property tax in Minnesota upon
stock owned by it in Montana and North Dakota state banks,
although these states also levied a tax upon the stock. The
court expressly refused to pass upon the legitimacy of the
tax in the other states, saying the question was not presented,
but held that it was sufficient for this case that the stock
had acquired a business situs in Minnesota, where its owner,
"in every practical sense invokes and enjoys the protectiorl
of the laws and, in consequence realizes the economic advan-
tages of his ownership." Throughout the opinion the terms
"business situs" and "commercial domicile" were used inter-
changeably.
Twice now in the same year we find the court upholding
the right of the state of business situs and/or commercial
domicile to tax, but refusing to decide the right of any other
state to also tax. It yet remains for two or more states
to present their dual claims in the same case.
We now come to the two cases handed down May 29,
1939; in each of which Mr. Justice Stone wrote the opinion
and in both of which Chief Justice Hughes, Mr. Justice Mc-
Reynolds, Mr. Justice Roberts and Mr. Justice Butler dis-
sent.
The first is that of Curry v. McCanless."4 The decedent,
domiciled in Tennessee, had executed an irrevocable trust,
constituting an Alabama bank trustee of intangibles, the in-
come to donor for life, the corpus to be disposed of as
directed in the donor's will. Thereafter, and until her death,
the intangibles were at all times in the trustee's custody in
Alabama. Decedent died a resident of Tennessee, having
executed her will there, by which she named an Alabama
trustee for the corpus of the intangibles in the Alabama trust,
to be held for her husband, son, and daughter, with certain
remainders in fee. Both states, conceding that only one was
entitled, contended for the right to impose an inheritance
tax upon the intangibles. The Supreme Court held that
both had the right.
44 307 U. S. 357.
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Not one of the opposing cases since Blackstone v. Miller
is specifically overruled, but the theory of multiple protection,
as announced by Mr. Justice Holmes, in that decision, is
revived, amplified and announced to have always been the
law. The concept of single taxation is finally and definitely
outlawed. "When the taxpayer extends his activities with
respect to intangibles, so as to avail himself of the protec-
tion and benefit of the laws of another state, in such a way
as to bring his person or property within the reach of the
tax gatherer there, the reason for a single place of taxation
no longer obtains. There are many circumstances in which
more than one state may have jurisdiction to impose a tax
and measure it by some or all of the taxpayer's intangibles."
Here the law of Tennessee was needed to render valid
decedent's will, reasons Mr. Justice Stone, and the law of
Alabama was needed to protect her property. "She neces-
sarily invoked the aid of the law of both states, and her
legatees, before they can secure and enjoy the benefits of
succession, must invoke the law of both"; citing Farmers
Loan and Trust Co. v. Minn.,4' Baldwin v. Mo., 46 and
First Natl. Bk. v. Me.
In the dissenting opinion Mr. Justice Butler argues that
at the time of her death, decedent "had no estate or interest
in the securities held by the trustee. There is no basis for
application of the fiction mobilia sequuntur personam. * * *
From the beginning, the trust estate has been under the
protection of, and necessarily the trusts have been and are
being executed under the law of Alabama, unaffected by the
laws of any other state. * * * Intangibles, like tangi-
bles, may be so held and used outside the state of the domi-
cile of the owner as to become taxable in the state where
kept. * * * The securities (here) * * * could
not be more completely localized anywhere * * *"
Justice Stone's opinion does not use the terms "business
situs," "commercial situs" or "situs analogous to that of
45 280 U. S. 204.
46 281 U. S. 586.
47 284 U. S. 312.
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tangible personal property." He merely traces the authori-
ties supporting the right to tax in each state and dovetails
them into a right to tax in both; on the easy reasoning that
both theories are right because the laws of both states are
invoked "through control over and protection afforded to
those persons whose relationships are the origin of the rights."
Thus we have added to the separation of interests in the
property itself, the notion that those who exercise the con-
trol of these interests may subject them to additional taxa-
tion by wandering into still different jurisdictions, from or
under the law of which, control may be exercised.
The second case, decided on May 29, 1939, is that of
Graves v. Elliott.48 A New York decedent had created a
revocable trust of corporate bonds, with a Denver, Colorado,
bank as trustee. She died without revoking the trust. New
York assessed an inheritance tax upon the relinquishment at
death of the power to revoke the trust, and the Supreme
Court upheld it. Mr. Justice Stone says the questions pre-
sented are the same as those considered in Curry v. McCan-
less. "The relinquishment at death, in consequence of the
non-existence in life, of a power to revoke a trust created
by a decedent is * * * an appropriate subject of taxa-
tion. * * * We cannot say that the legal interest of
decedent in the intangibles held in trust in Colorado was
so disassociated from her person as to be beyond the taxing
jurisdiction of the state of her domicile more than her other
rights in intangibles."
In the dissenting opinion Chief Justice Hughes calls at-
tention to the fact that it is not even disputed now that it
"is essential to the validity of a tax that the property should
be within the territorial jurisdiction of the taxing power.
* * * The importance of this limitation of state power
is obvious in view of the interrelation of the states under the
bond of the constitution and of the opportunities for op-
pressive taxation if states attempt to tax'property or trans-
fers of property not properly attributable to their domain."
48 83 L. Ed. 865.
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Truly, to the lay mind, as well perhaps to the practical
legal mind, the limit of complexity has been reached by the
holding of this case. It would be hard enough to explain
to a client why his failure to take back something that he
has already given away, should make that something subject
to inheritance tax upon his death; but to explain to him why
the state where he lives should have that right to tax, in
addition to the state where the subject of the gift is located,
would be slightly more difficult.
Curry v. McCanless is affirmed in Pearson v. McGraw,4"
decided December 4, 1939. An Oregon decedent, shortly
before his death, caused an Illinois bank, which for many
years had kept and handled as his agent a large amount on
intangibles, to convert them into federal reserve notes, which
he immediately made the subject of an irrevocable trust,
with the Illinois bank as trustee. The Supreme Court of
Oregon, on the authority of Blodgett v. Silberman,5 ° held
that the notes were tangibles, and since they had not been
brought into the state but had acquired a business situs in
Illinois, the Oregon statute could not contravene the Four-
teenth Amendment by authorizing a succession tax upon their
transfer in contemplation of death.
In reversing the case, the Supreme Court, Justice Douglas
speaking, held that there was "but one integrated and indi-
visible transaction * * * the sale of intangibles, the
acquisition of federal reserve notes and their transfer" into
the trust; i. e. a transfer of intangibles in contemplation of
death. Therefore "the property was within the jurisdiction
of the state of Oregon, since that jurisdiction is not depend-
ent on the physical location of the property in the state but
on control over the owner."
Mr. Justice Stone, concurring, thought that the real reason
for allowing the tax was that federal reserve notes are not
tangible property, and, being intangibles, there is nothing in
the Constitution which precludes their taxation in Oregon
49 84- L. Ed. 139.
50 277 U. S. 1.
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"merely because of the physical fact that they are located
without the state."
The writer confesses inability to understand the significance
of the distinction. If, as Mr. Justice Stone reasons in Curry
v. McCanless, the law of domicil is necessarily involved to
protect the validity of decedent's will, what difference can
it make whether it is tangible or intangible property that
passes under the will?
Chief Justice Hughes and Messrs. Justice McReynolds
and Roberts have apparently given up their struggle against
the majority of the court, for there is no dissenting opinion.
Let us now examine these three decisions to see how far
they uphold multiple taxation in the hypothetical case of the
Indiana decedent who owned the share of stock of the Dela-
ware corporation which he had used in his business in Illinois,
and directed from his office in Michigan; the stock certificate
being found in Wisconsin at the time of his death.
Quoting Mr. Justice Stone from Curry v. McCanless:
"Shares of corporate stock may be taxed at the domicil of
the shareholder and also at that of the corporation which
the taxing state has created and controls." First Natl. Bk.
v. Maine having been impliedly overruled, and the principle
applying equally to inheritance and property taxes, it is
apparent that under the holding of the case, the stock is
subject to both taxes in Delaware and Indiana. Further
quoting Mr. Justice Stone: "The taxpayer who is domiciled
in one state but carries on business in another is subject to
a tax there measured by the value of the intangibles used
in his business." This brings Illinois within the fold.
JF'heeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, which advanced the commer-
cial domicil theory, is approved, so Michigan may tax.
"When the taxpayer," says Mr. Justice Stone, "brings his
intangibles within the reach of the tax gatherer" of another
state "the reason for a single place of taxation no longer
exists." Therefore Wisconsin, where the bond was found,
is safely in.
Mr. Justice Stone, in Curry v. McCanless, tacitly admits
the iniquity of his conclusion, but blames the unfortunate
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and oft-maligned authors of our Constiution thus: "If we
enjoyed the freedom of the framers it is possible that we
might, in the light of experience, devise a more equitable
system of taxation than that which they gave us." Without
so stating, he inferentially shifts the solution to his two
earlier expressed alternatives-to keep intangibles at home
or trust them to the caprice of reciprocal state legislation.5'
"No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States."
If the Constitution means what it says in this particular, it
is difficult to see why the Supreme Court should strain itself
with niceties of legal verbiage in order to avoid a desired
result. In this era of delegation of judicial functions to
boards, administrators and bureaus; with the constant re-
fusal of our Federal Courts to disturb their unjust findings
of fact, the attitude of the layman toward the law becomes
constantly more skeptical and his faith in lawyers increasing
more shallow. Our fundamental notion is that our Consti-
tution will not permit any state to deprive a citizen of any
other state of "life, liberty or property without due process
of law." To illustrate with the due process by which our
highest court has arrived at the conclusion that two or more
states may levy the same tax upon the same property at the
same time, is to confound the syllogism which results in our
hackneyed fundament that law is reason. In the complexity
of our twentieth century struggle to stay out of one war,
while emerging from the depression of another, we find
the eternal fight for unitary economic existence not limited
to national boundaries. The creation of trade barriers, the
armed resistance to hordes of transcient workers, the bait of
tax exemption to industries of another state, the competition
for favorable freight rates-these things and many others,
51 The following states do not levy an inheritance tax upon intangibles of
non-resident decedents: Delaware, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Virginia. The following
can levy such tax: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, District of Columbia, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
South Dakota, Utah and Washington. The states not named, except Nevada,
have reciprocal statutes. Nevada has no estate tax.
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tend to strain relations between the states. Is the Constitu-
tion powerless to protect the citizens of one state from in-
fringement on his rights by the laws of another; or must
such matters be relegated entirely to the uncertainty of recip-
rocal state legislation? Whether we agree with Ex-President
Hogan of the American Bar that the Supreme Court has let
down its guards against the exercise of arbitrary power, or
with Senator Burnes that the Court is but listening to the
lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning, we
lawyers cannot help but deplore results which shock the
average citizen in his concept of fair play. Just as lawyers
are apt to forget a decision like Blackstone v. Miller until
another is handed down going into the problem all over
again and deciding it the same way, so do we all forget that
our security in property rights is fundamentally guaranteed
only by the Constitution of the United States and that "the
Constitution is what the Supreme Court says it is."
